Computer Incident Response and Product Security: Operating an Incident Response Team

This chapter is from the book

Computer Incident Response and Product Security

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This chapter is from the book

This chapter is from the book 

Computer Incident Response and Product Security

Learn More Buy

Cooperation with Internal Groups

In the same way the IRT cannot operate in isolation from the other IRTs, it also cannot operate without support and cooperation from various internal groups and departments. Depending on the particular case, not all departments or functions might be present in the host organization, but if they are, the IRT should consider liaising with them. The groups and departments are as follows:

• Physical security
• Legal department
• Press relation
• Internal IT security
• Executives
• Product security teams
• Internal IT and network operation center (NOC)

Physical Security

Without good old-fashioned physical security, many state-of-the-art security mechanisms would not properly work. There are examples where hardware keyloggers have been installed on computers. That was possible only if someone had physical access to computers. Equipment theft is also possible only if someone can physically grab the equipment.

This group usually operates, or has access to, Closed Circuit TV (CCTV) cameras, if they are installed on the premises. Therefore, their cooperation is invaluable in cases where identity of a person must be confirmed.

Occasionally, it is these people who have power to arrest and detain. So, if the IRT is sure that they identified the culprit within the organization, someone from the physical security group would make an arrest.

Legal Department

Many of us have made some joking remarks on lawyers’ accounts, but joking aside, they exist to protect the organization and to protect you. They can be an invaluable asset. The IRT must work to identify whom, from the legal side, would support the team in its job. The best results can be achieved if someone, or a few people, are given an extra task to support the IRT on a long-term basis.

You must expect to invest a considerable effort at the beginning while the legal team learns about the security world and the IRT learns about the legal challenges. Only after both sides understand each other’s positions can real cooperation begin.

The IRT should bring all new or different incidents to the attention of the legal team. In the majority of cases, the legal team might decide that the new case falls under one of the previously encountered issues. It is a remaining few that will prompt the legal team to look deeper into the matter to see how the organization can better protect itself from the legal perspective. These improvements might range from the way the IRT approaches similar incidents to modified contracts that the organization will use in the future.

It is also a good idea that lawyers from different organizations reach out to each other and start a dialogue. This area is relatively young, and there are many interesting challenges ahead. It is much easier if they are approached collectively than individually. One such attempt is underway as a part of the Vendor Special Interest Group forum under FIRST. Interested parties can visit http://www.first.org/vendor-sig/index.html and contact moderators.

Press Relations

Sooner or later, the IRT might be involved in a big, or interesting, case, and the press might approach the team to give a statement. Talking to the press can be tricky. Usually the journalists would like to receive as much information as possible, whereas the IRT might not want to disclose all the information, at least not at that particular moment.

The easiest way to handle the press is to have a dedicated PR person assigned to the team to work closely with it. Failing that, the next option is to have someone from the IRT receive PR training and act as the team’s spokesperson. The last, and the least desirable option, is to have somebody, without any training, step in front of the journalists. Whatever your case happens to be, following are a few simple tips on what to do when talking to the press:

• There is no such thing as “off the record.” Whatever you say can end up being printed. If something is not to be mentioned at the time, do not mention it under any circumstances.
• Be prepared. If possible, ask for questions in advance and prepare the answers.
• Ask to review the final article before it will be published.
• Do not lie. Sooner or later, people will find the truth, and then your credibility is gone—not only your personal credibility, but also the credibility of your team and the organization.
• Do not speculate. Know the facts and stick to them. It is better to say that something is not known than to speculate.
• Know what can be said. Always keep within safe limits. When necessary, a “no comments” phrase can be handy to use.
• Have a message to pass to journalists.
• Do not always answer a question that was asked but one that you would like to be asked (thank Alan Greenspan for this one). If used judiciously, this can help with getting your points to journalists.

Listed like that, it does not sound like much, but it might not be easy to accomplish every time.

If your team is lucky to have a dedicated PR person, she can help you with promoting your team. The PR person can also proactively work with journalists and help them understand what the IRT is doing, why, and how. This all can help you greatly in the time of crisis because informed journalists can present the facts in a more accurate light.

If you judge that an incident might generate inquiries from the press, you should prepare a holding statement that can be used if a journalist contacts the organization and asks for a statement. An example of such an event might be an incident that affects many other companies or has especially significant and severe consequences for your organization.

In virtually all cases, there is not much benefit from proactively contacting the press and offering information about an incident. If an incident occurs, the organization has the IRT that can handle the situation. The business continues as usual. The exception to this rule might be a situation in which someone else will publicize the situation, and you want your version of the events to be heard first.

Internal IT Security

Some organizations might have a separate group that handles only internal security cases, cases pertaining to the host organization. This setup can occur when, for business reasons, all customers’ incidents are handled by one team and internal cases by another.

In that case, the internal IT security group is a natural an ally of the IRT. Having a close relationship can be mutually beneficial. Both teams can organize regular meetings to exchange information on what kind of attacks they are seeing and observe trends. The group handling customers’ incidents should provide information only on types of attacks but not who has been attacked. In addition to the regular information exchange, both teams should enable members from one team to rotate into another team and spend some time working with the other group.

Despite all this synergy between the teams, some functions will be duplicated. If business reasons dictate the existence of two teams, duplication is natural.

Executives

It was mentioned previously that the IRT should have an executive sponsor. Apart from having a sponsor, the IRT must have the means to reach other executives. There must be an arrangement for the IRT to brief the executives on a regular basis and when emergencies occur.

Regular briefings are important so that the executives can learn about the organization’s exposure to the newest security threats. They can also learn about the IRT’s challenges to address the threats and make appropriate decisions. This communication is even more important during the crisis. Additionally, because of the exposure the team will get, the executives will know whom to talk to when they need more information. This way, executives will not waste time asking around and receiving nonauthoritative or plainly wrong information. For executives, it is vital to be informed whether their part of the organization is affected by the incident and, if it is, how and to what extent.

Direct communication with the executives is important for the IRT because it provides a visibility opportunity for the team. The security of the organization and the IRT will gain in stature in the eyes of the executives. Visibility and consistent good performance will transform the IRT into a trusted adviser to the executives on matters related to information security.

A consistent and constant information flow from the IRT to the executives is important. For executives to rely on the team’s messages, they must follow a fixed pattern. Even if the message is “nothing to report,” it must be delivered when expected. In a crisis, the messaging period will change and will be delivered when required instead of waiting for the next scheduled time slot. It is not necessary that the message is always delivered in person. Often an email or voice message will suffice.

The format of the message must be suitable for the purpose. Executives are busy people with little time to waste, so the communication must be specifically tailored to fit the purpose. That encompasses not only the graphical layout but also the file format and media. Big Microsoft Word files are not useful if received on a Blackberry. Voice mail can be a more noticeable event than receiving yet another email. On the other hand, it is easier to reread a mail message multiple times than listen to the same voice mail, especially if the interesting part of the message is close to its end. The teams must know what it wants to accomplish and tailor the messaging accordingly.

Here are few tips when communicating with the executives:

• Frequency: Not more often that every two weeks but not less than once a month for regular updates. During a crisis, the first message should be sent as soon as the severity of an incident reaches a certain criteria. (For example, the number of compromised hosts, certain key hosts, or what services are compromised.) After that point, the frequency should be a function of the incident, and reporting can be done from every hour to once a day.

• Content: Keep it short and simple. Provide pointers to where all details are being kept. Order information chronologically so that the most recent information is presented first. Background information can be added at the end. Do not forget to include the impact to the organization—why this communication is important to the executives. The next steps and the time of the next communication also must be presented, together with actions that executives must undertake.

  When sending both an email and a voice message, they should not be identical. The email can contain more background information, whereas the voice message should focus only on the most recent developments.

• Format: Between two slides to four slides for regular face-to-face meetings. For all other regular updates, text email (no Microsoft Word or Adobe PDF documents) together with a voice message should be used. Text email is preferred over all other formats because it can be quickly downloaded even over a slow connection (for example, a 2400-baud modem line in a hotel) and easily read on any device.

  A web page must be created where executives can find all the information. That must be a single top-level page that gives an overall view of all current events. This top-level page must then contain links for each individual incident and to all other communications to the executives.

• Length: Optimally, approximately 2 and not longer than 3 minutes for a voice mail and a one-page email (approximately 200 words to 300 words). Everything else should be given as additional information on a web page.

Here are examples of a voice message and an accompanying email that provide an update on an ongoing incident. We will assume that the update is provided once daily. The voice mail is given first:

• This is Joe Smith with an update regarding the incident that occurred on January 30, 2009. This voice mail is sent to the emergency executive council. The full list of the recipients is given at the end of this message. All information in this message is confidential.
• On January 30th, unknown attackers used an unpatched vulnerability to gain access to servers in accounting and engineering. The unauthorized access was discovered when attackers were transferring files to an external server. There is no PR coverage of the incident.
• The status on February 3rd is that 60% of all servers in the organization have been patched. All servers in accounting are patched and are all back online. 80% of servers in engineering are patched. The help desk is the most exposed part of the organization, with only 20% of servers patched. Our IRT report web page contains full details of the patching progress.
• In addition to patching, our intrusion prevention systems are updated with the new signature, and all firewalls are configured to make exploitation of the vulnerability harder.
• We expect to patch all servers in the organization by February 10th. Determining the extent of leaked personal information will be finished by February 5th. After the scope of the leak is determined, the Legal and HR department will be engaged to asses our legal exposure.
• No actions are required from the executive council at this time.
• The next regular update is on February 4th at 14:00.
• This message is sent to: name_1, name_2, ....
• Regards,

  Joe Smith

The accompanying email can look like this:

• From: IRT@example.com
• Subject: Status on the security compromise on 2009-Feb-03
• —— CONFIDENTIAL – DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ——
• Hello,
• This is Joe Smith with an update about the incident that occurred on January 30, 2009. This email is sent to the emergency executive council.
• Background
• On January 30th, unknown attackers used an unpatched vulnerability to gain access to servers in accounting and engineering. The unauthorized access was discovered when attackers were transferring files to an external server. There is no PR coverage of the incident.
• All details related to this incident can be found at http://www.example.com/IRT/incident web page.
• Current status
• Patching is in progress across all the organization. The following table provides status per individual parts of the organizations:
• Accounting: 100%
• Engineering: 80%
• Manufacturing: 40%
• Web-farm and mail servers: 70%
• Help desk: 20%
• Overall: 62%
• In addition to patching, our intrusion prevention systems are updated with the new signature, and all firewalls are configured to make exploitation of the vulnerability harder.
• The next update will be sent on Feb 04 at 14:00.
• Next milestones
• Feb 05—Determine the scope of personal information leak.
• Feb 06—Engage Legal and HR to determine legal exposure due to personal information leak.
• Feb 10—100% of servers to be patched.
• Pending executive actions
• No actions were required from the executive council at this time.
• Regards,
• Joe Smith
• —— CONFIDENTIAL – DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ——

Product Security Team

If the host organization is a vendor that is responsible for developing and maintenance of a product or service, it should have a dedicated team that deals with security vulnerabilities in the products. Similarly, like with the situation with IT, both teams, product security and IRT, can benefit from having close ties. The product security team can provide information on different vulnerabilities so that the IRT can start looking at whether it is being exploited. Information on vulnerabilities can also be used to reevaluate some old data. What was previously seen as only noise or random attempts might suddenly be seen as focused efforts to exploit a particular vulnerability.

The product security team can benefit from receiving information on new attacks, analyzing how the attacks affect its products, and passing the knowledge to the group responsible for maintenance and product design.

Even if the organization is not a vendor, the team should establish ties with vendors’ product security teams. At least, the IRT must know how to contact them. Vendors always appreciate when they receive notification on a new vulnerability or other suspicious behavior of their products.

Internal IT and NOC

Depending on the organization’s size and complexity, you may have a separate IT group that maintains and monitors the internal network. If you are an Internet service provider (ISP), you probably would have a separate network operation center (NOC) that maintains a network used by your customers. These two groups are your partners. They can provide the IRT with the current information on what is happening in the network (internal or external). They can also provide early warnings about new attacks while they are being tested¹. NOC, in particular, can add network-centric view on attacks and contribute methods how to combat attacks using network infrastructure.