This chapter is from the book
This chapter is from the book
This chapter is from the book
Conclusion
As campaigns increasingly look to the online medium to gather support, it is important to consider the inherent risks that will follow. In this chapter, we discussed a number of risks that may present themselves in any election campaign; however, it is important to acknowledge that many more remain that we have not discussed.
It is apparent both from past events and from our findings that candidates and their campaigns are just beginning to understand the risks of online advocacy and have yet to take the necessary precautions to protect themselves. Our fear is that a true appreciation of the required countermeasures will not be realized until these attacks do, in fact, manifest themselves.
Many of these individual risks, when combined, would result in increasingly sophisticated attacks. While we have discussed many of these risks independently, the combination of these threats creates complex new variations that are already being seen in the wild in other areas such as online banking and ecommerce.
Our goal in writing this chapter was not to sow seeds in the minds of would-be attackers or to spread fear, uncertainty, and doubt, but rather to discuss real-world risks that already exist. None of the attacks discussed here are new or novel; we have simply applied them to a specific recurring event, the election process. Our hope is to raise awareness of the potential risks before they are able to manifest themselves in the upcoming 2008 federal election, or any election that follows.
One thing is clear: It is impossible for us to predict how successful any one of these attacks might be in making a material impact on the election process. Given our experiences with previous widespread Internet-borne risks, we certainly do have an appreciation and respect for the potential that they present. While that is not to be discounted lightly, only time will tell how dangerous they become.
In addition, if a successful widespread attack were to occur (one that was recognized to have swayed the vote), what recourse is there? What if intimidation, misinformation, and infectious election-targeted malicious code become the norm?