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Protect Your Windows Network: From Perimeter to Data
- By Jesper M. Johansson, Steve Riley
- Published May 20, 2005 by Addison-Wesley Professional.
Book
- Sorry, this book is no longer in print.
About
Features
A revolutionary, soups-to-nuts approach to network security from two of Microsoft's leading security experts
° The authors are the two most widely known security experts at Microsoft, and will be promoting this book extensively
° Provides a unique approach to network security, covering all seven layers of the Defense in Depth model
° Contains information on topics not covered in other books, such as Network Threat Modeling, the Defense in Depth Model, and security dependencies
Description
- Copyright 2005
- Dimensions: 7" x 9-1/4"
- Pages: 608
- Edition: 1st
- Book
- ISBN-10: 0-321-33643-7
- ISBN-13: 978-0-321-33643-9
While there are a lot of books available on network security, most of them take
the approach of focusing on the attacks, on the hacks, and responding to those
on a one-by-one basis. This book does just the opposite, focusing on a holistic
approach to protecting your entire network. It covers all seven layers of the
Defense in Depth (DID) Model, as well as other material not covered in any
other books. DID refers to a system of combining defenses to provide added
protection. Since there are then multiple barriers between the attacker and the
attacked, this increases the level of security, and increases the cost of the attack
to the attacker. The authors are two senior members of Microsoft's Security
and Business Technology Unit (SBTU), and are among the most sought-after
speakers for security conferences. With security being such a strong focus at
Microsoft, this book is destined to become the standard guide for all network
administrators and architects who want to have the most secure Windows
network possible.
Sample Content
Online Sample Chapters
Anatomy Of A Hack—The Rise And Fall Of Your Network
The Fundamental Reasons for Protecting Your Windows Network
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Download the Sample
Chapter related to this title.
Table of Contents
Acknowledgments.
About the Authors.
Preface.
I. INTRODUCTION AND FUNDAMENTALS.
1. Introduction to Network Protection.
Why Would Someone Attack Me?
Nobody Will Ever Call You to Tell You How Well the Network Is Working
Introduction to the Defense-in-Depth Model
The Defender's Dilemma
Summary
What You Should Do Today
2. Anatomy of a Hack-The Rise and Fall of Your Network.
What a Penetration Test Will Not Tell You
Why You Need To Understand Hacking
Target Network
Network Footprinting
Initial Compromise
Elevating Privileges
Hacking Other Machines
Taking Over the Domain
Post-mortem
How to Get an Attacker Out of Your Network
Summary
What You Should Do Today
3. Rule Number 1: Patch Your Systems.
Patches Are a Fact of Life
Exercise Good Judgment
What Is a Patch?
Patch Management Is Risk Management
Tools to Manage Security Updates
Advanced Tips and Tricks
Slipstreaming
Summary
What You Should Do Today
II. POLICIES, PROCEDURES, AND USER AWARENESS.
4. Developing Security Policies.
Who Owns Developing Security Policy
What a Security Policy Looks Like
Why a Security Policy Is Necessary
Why So Many Security Policies Fail
Analyzing Your Security Needs to Develop _Appropriate Policies
How to Make Users Aware of Security Policies
Procedures to Enforce Policies
Dealing with Breaches of Policy
More Information
Summary
What You Should Do Today
5. Educating Those Pesky Users.
System Administration ? Security Administration
Securing People
The Problem
Protecting People
Plausibility + Dread + Novelty = Compromise
Things You Should Do Today
III. PHYSICAL AND PERIMETER SECURITY: THE FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE.
6. If You Do Not Have Physical Security, You Do Not Have Security.
But First, a Story
It's a Fundamental Law of Computer Security
The Importance of Physical Access Controls
Protecting Client PCs
The Case of the Stolen Laptop
The Family PC
No Security, Physical or Otherwise, Is Completely Foolproof
Things You Should Do Today
7. Protecting Your Perimeter.
The Objectives of Information Security
The Role of the Network
Start with (What's Left of) Your Border
Next, Use the Right Firewall
Then, Consider Your Remote Access Needs
Finally, Start Thinking About "Deperimeterization"
Things You Should Do Today
IV. PROTECTING YOUR NETWORK INSIDE THE PERIMETER.
8. Security Dependencies.
Introduction to Security Dependencies
Administrative Security Dependencies
Service Account Dependencies
Mitigating Service and Administrative Dependencies
Other Security Dependencies
Summary
What You Should Do Today
9. Network Threat Modeling.
Network Threat Modeling Process
Document Your Network
Segment Your Network
Restrict Access to Your Network
Summary
What You Should Do Today
10. Preventing Rogue Access Inside the Network.
The Myth of Network Sniffing
Network Protection at Layers 2 and 3
Using 802.1X for Network Protection
Using IPsec for Network Protection
Network Quarantine Systems
Summary
What You Should Do Today
11. Passwords and Other Authentication Mechanisms-The Last Line of Defense.
Introduction
Password Basics
Password History
What Administrators Need to Know About Passwords
Password Best Practices
Recommended Password Policy
Better Than Best Practices-Multifactor Authentication
Summary
What You Should Do Today
V. PROTECTING HOSTS.
12. Server and Client Hardening.
Security Configuration Myths
On to the Tweaks
Top 10 (or so) Server Security Tweaks
Top 10 (or so) Client Security Tweaks
The Caution List-Changes You Should Not Make
Security Configuration Tools
Summary
What You Should Do Today
VI. PROTECTING APPLICATIONS.
13. Protecting User Applications.
Patch Them!
Make Them Run As a Nonadmin
Turn Off Functionality
Restrict Browser Functionality
Attachment Manager
Spyware
Security Between Chair and Keyboard (SeBCAK)
Summary
What You Should Do Today
14. Protecting Services and Server Applications.
You Need a Healthy Disrespect for Your Computer
Rule 1: All Samples Are Evil
Three Steps to Lowering the Attack Surface
What About Service Accounts?
Privileges Your Services Do Not Need
Hardening SQL Server 2000
Hardening IIS 5.0 and 6.0
Summary
What You Should Do Today
15. Security for Small Businesses.
Protect Your Desktops and Laptops
Protect Your Servers
Protect Your Network
Keep Your Data Safe
Use the Internet Safely
Small Business Security Is No Different, Really
What You Should Do Today
16. Evaluating Application Security.
Caution: More Software May Be Hazardous to Your Network Health
Baseline the System
Things to Watch Out For
Summary
What You Should Do Today
VII. PROTECTING DATA.
17. Data-Protection Mechanisms.
Security Group Review
Access Control Lists
Layers of Access Control
Access Control Best Practices
Rights Management Systems
Incorporating Data Protection into Your Applications
Protected Data: Our Real Goal
What You Should Do Today
Appendix A: How to Get Your Network Hacked in 10 Easy Steps.
Appendix B: Script To Revoke SQL Server PUBLIC Permissions.
Appendix C. HOSTS file to Block Spyware.
Appendix D. Password Generator Tool.
-g (Generate Password Based on Known Input)
-r (Generate Random Password)
-s (Set a Password on an Account and/or Service)
Security Information
Usage Scenarios
Appendix E: 10 Immutable Laws of Security.
Law #1: If a bad guy can persuade you to run his program on your computer, it's not your computer anymore.
Law #2: If a bad guy can alter the operating system on your computer, it's not your computer anymore.
Law #3: If a bad guy has unrestricted physical access to your computer, it's not your computer anymore.
Law #4: -If you allow a bad guy to upload programs to your Web site, it's not your Web site any more.
Law #5: Weak passwords trump strong security.
Law #6: A computer is only as secure as the administrator is trustworthy. Law #7: Encrypted data is only as secure as the decryption key.
Law #8: An out-of-date virus scanner is only marginally better than no virus scanner at all.
Law #9: Absolute anonymity isn't practical, in real life or on the Web. Law #10: Technology is not a panacea.
Index.
Preface
After writing the outline and the first chapter, I decided that I needed a co-author to help out, particularly because I simply do not know nearly as much as I would like about certain topics. Because Steve had already had his own thoughts about writing a book, this was a great match. Steve is a perfect complement in the sense that both of us started the same way, in networking, but unlike myself, who went into IT so I could avoid having to deal with people, Steve is actually an extrovert who loves to figure out how to protect people from people. Of course, both of us enjoy debating controversial opinions, mostly just for the thrill of the argument. Working together, the book slowly started to take shape.
The book is focused around the defense-in-depth model we helped develop and refine in our work at Microsoft, and it gives a logical flow to the book that helps in building an overall security strategy, something both of us believed was lacking in the current literature. You get only so much security if you concentrate solely on the technology; the people and the processes are equally important. Indeed, without thought in those two areas, most of the technology you deploy to protect information systems will fail to do what you intend—it will only give you a false sense of security, which in fact can be more dangerous than no security at all.
Much of what you see in these pages has been said before, in various presentations. Both of us travel the world to deliver speeches on security, and if you have ever heard us you will no doubt recognize some of the things you will read in these pages. In a sense, the book is the lecture notes everyone who has heard our presentations keeps asking for. Of course, those notes are sorely needed because most of our presentations are increasingly light on slides to avoid that all-too-common malady: death by PowerPoint.
Everyone we know who has written a book always says in the foreword that their first book is one they wanted to write for a long time. (We are now wondering what's left for us to write in our second book.) That is good, because it takes a long time to write a book. Neither of us thought that we had the competency to write one until recently, so it is not really true that we have wanted to write it for a long time. We have certainly thought about security for a long time, though, and you could certainly say that we wanted to learn enough about it for a long time to have something meaningful to say. After we had spent a few years talking to people, it was clear that security is an area that is fraught with misunderstandings (as we see them) and snake oil (pseudo-solutions that do not do what they purport to do at best, and are harmful at worst).
We find this type of "security theater" all around us. Consider, for instance, next time you go through an airport security check, who would be capable of causing more damage: a 92-year-old great-grandmother with a pair of cuticle scissors, or a 22-year-old martial arts black belt? They will confiscate the cuticle scissors, but they will allow the martial arts champion on the plane without putting him in shackles first. Some secure facilities will confiscate USB drives (and GPS receivers—why in the world?) "for security reasons," but they allow 80 GB FireWire (i1394) drives through because the security personnel cannot imagine any "threats" associated with digital music players. Many organizations have a password policy that requires users to use passwords too long and complicated to remember (and then routinely complain about the expense of resetting locked-out accounts), they block any kind of information gathering from ancient operating systems, and they do it all on computers that have not been patched for more than a year! It may appear that they are providing security but in reality this is nothing more than security theater.
We finally decided that the right way to dispel these myths was to write a book. At the time, it seemed like a really good idea, and we are sure that at some point it will seem like a good idea again.
Target Audience and ObjectiveThis book is targeted at anyone who has the unfortunate yet delightful task of having to manage the security of a computer system or network of systems. Because we deal almost exclusively with relatively large networks running primarily some flavor of Microsoft Windows, the book focuses on that type of environment. However, we hope that just about anyone involved in managing security will find something of value in these pages.
Security in information technology is an evolving field; so evolving, in fact, that there is not really a clear name for it. Some people, ourselves included sometimes, call it information security (infosec). We like that term, because protecting information is the ultimate goal. However, it is also important to protect the data before it becomes information, and it is important to protect the resources and functionality provided by the systems in the network, and infosec does not capture that very well. Computer security gives us a connotation of protecting a single computer, and single computers simply are not that interesting today. Others call the field distributed systems security. However, as we explain in Chapter 1, "Introduction to Network Protection," we think distributed systems is a terrible idea from a security perspective and we want to avoid that term. Thus, we stuck with network security, which means protecting all the assets in the network.
Just as with the name of the field, many other issues are up for debate in network security. Therefore, what you will find in these pages is often our opinion of what is correct. Nowhere is this more pronounced than in Chapter 12, "Server and Client Hardening," but you will find the same phenomenon elsewhere. You may already have an opinion that is not the same as ours, or you may not. The point is not so much to persuade you that our opinion is correct as it is to make you think about the whole picture. If you do that, and come to a conclusion that is different from ours, then our objective has been met. We simply are trying to make you challenge the perceived (often outdated) wisdom and form a conclusion that helps you better protect your network.
What Is on the CD
The CD has a few tools that we wrote, partially because we needed a break from
writing chapters, and partially because we thought they would be fun to write.
Hopefully you will find some of these useful:
• A HOSTS file a friend of ours gave us to black hole many spyware sites. It simply maps all their DNS names to localhost thus preventing the machine from accessing them. Just copy it into %systemroot%\system32\drivers\etc to use it. You can get an even bigger one at http://www.mvps.org/winhelp2002, and we recommend you update your HOSTS file from there every week or so.
• A password generator. Passgen is an enterprise-class, command- line password manager. We discuss it more in Chapter 11, "Passwords and Other Authentication Mechanisms—The Last Line of Defense," and Chapter 8, "Security Dependencies." Also look at the readme for more information.
• An SQL script to revoke all permissions from the public login. Use with care, but it is fun to see how much public has access to. You use it by pasting it into a Query Analyzer window. It will generate another query as output. If you copy and paste the output into another Query Analyzer window and run it, all the public permissions are revoked.
• A slipstreaming tool. Like passgen, it is another custom tool developed specifically for the book. This VBScript is used to create on-disk operating system installations that already have all the patches applied—which turns out to be an involved process if you do it by hand. Instead, run the slipstream script, tell it where the source files are, where the patches are, and which service pack and operating system you are building; it will automatically build an on-disk install that has all the patches. We wrote this in VBScript because we figured it would be small and short. 1,100 lines of code later, we simply were not interested in rewriting it in a cooler and more efficient language.
We hope you will find these tools useful. They are licensed for your use within the organization that pays for the book. Please respect intellectual property rights and do not spread them around. Likewise, if you receive a copy of one of these tools from somewhere other than the CD, do not run it until you verify its authenticity. The SHA-1 hash of the slipstream tool is ddcf0bbaa4f09319f0d804df79ae60692748dbc9, and the one of the passgen tool is a10baed3102b2183569077a3fbe18113a658ed5d. If you get a copy of either tool with a different SHA-1 hash, do not use it! Instead, send us an e-mail at ProtectYourNetwork@hotmail.com, and we will get you a legitimate copy.
Acknowledgments
Once we had all the material, the drive, the marital buy-off, and all the other
pieces for the book together, we were still missing one thing: a publisher.
Karen Gettman at Addison-Wesley has seen us speak numerous times and has bugged
us for a couple years to write for her; we are immensely indebted to her for
giving us a chance and for letting us have almost unlimited artistic license
in what we were doing.
We are also extremely grateful to our reviewers, particularly Susan Bradley, one of the sharpest and most vocal MVPs Microsoft has. As Michael Howard once noted about Jesper in the introduction to the first edition of Writing Secure Code, Susan read every single word, sentence, chapter, and paragraph, and had comments on every single word, sentence, chapter, and paragraph—and plenty of comments about things not in the book as well. If the book makes sense to system administrators in small businesses, it is entirely because of Susan. If it does not, it is our fault. We also had great feedback from our other reviewers, including, Corey Hynes, Richard Waymire, Gene Schultz, Marcus Murray, Mark Russinovich, Matt Bishop, Michael Howard, Rob Hensing, Brian Komar, David LeBlanc, Ben Smith, Jon Wall, Chris Wysopal, Kevin McDonnell, Michael Angelo, Byron Hynes, Harlan Carvey, Russ Rogers, James Morris, Robert Shimonski, Kurt Dillard, Rick Kingslan, Phil Cox, and James Edelen.
Last, but certainly not least, we are indebted (forever, in an irreparable sort of way) to our lovely wives Jennifer and Ingrid. Not only did they let us get away with writing the book, but also with traveling around the world talking to people, which both of us enjoy tremendously.
We hope to see you soon at an event near you!
—Jesper and Steve
Index
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